Nussbaum, Martha. (1997). Cultivating Humanity: A Classical
Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge:
Harvard
University Press
pp. ix + 328
$15.95 (Paper) ISBN 0-674-17948-X
James Scott Johnston
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
January 25, 2000
What role should philosophy play in the contemporary
undergraduate liberal arts curriculum? Should a formal course in
the discipline be required? Or is a philosophical "attitude" or
"approach" across the disciplines sufficient? Can reasoned,
critical thinking be taught without a formal course in
philosophy? And if philosophy as a coherent, formal discipline
is necessary, what, if any thing, is it beyond a method of
reasoning, or critical examination, of tactics that can be
disseminated in various disciplines, that necessitates its
inclusion? These are all critical questions that beg for an
answer, particularly for proponents of both traditional liberal
arts education and philosopher-teachers of undergraduate
students. Therefore it is refreshing to see scholarship on this
subject, particularly from an internationally renowned
philosopher such as Martha Nussbaum in her Cultivating
Humanity. Yet I have misgivings about certain aspects of
her thesis. For her argument involves claiming a privileged
place for philosophy in the canon of liberal studies. I believe
that this argument needs to be challenged.
Nussbaum highlights fifteen diverse undergraduate programs
in liberal arts and sciences, and thereby aims to show that
schools are responding in various degrees to the requirements of
education for world-citizenry. Through an examination of these
curricula, Nussbaum reaffirms that American undergraduate
education does not need a complete overhaul, but rather a
critical self-examination of a Socratic kind. Nussbaum suggests
that critical self-reflection should premise any educational
program that attempts to produce an enlightened, rational
citizen capable of sensitivity to world affairs. In this respect
she differs little from Dewey (1944), who argued along similar
lines. An abundance of the skills of rational inquiry, critical
self-examination, and a neo-Kantian conception of justice,
fairness and equality, are necessary for the emerging "world
citizen" she champions. She considers these skills particularly
important in light of the attacks generated by postmodernist and
poststructuralist thought—critical as it is of the Socratic
tradition of reasoned argumentation (Nussbaum, 1997, p.41).
But where specifically are these skills to be located in
the curriculum? Philosophy, that is, the formal study of the
discipline in a structured academic setting, is considered the
most appropriate vehicle for attaining such skills.
(Note 1)
"In most cases then—wherever an institution is not
confident that students will generally elect such courses
on their own with faculty advice—a course or courses in
philosophy should be required of all students. This may be
done in a variety of ways. One may straightforwardly
require a philosophy course, whether one chooses from the
established departmental curriculum or from a separate
group of introductory courses. One may, as Harvard does,
require a course in "moral reasoning" that draws on faculty
from several disciplines, with a common mission. One may
also aim to infuse philosophical reasoning and analysis
into a basic humanities course, for example a course that
reads a range of major philosophical texts. The
disciplinary base of such courses should not stray too far
from philosophy, or the rigor of analysis so important for
the Socratic virtues of mind will be diluted." (Nussbaum,
1997, p.41)
In line with the above, Nussbaum's assumptions about the
role that philosophy should play in the undergraduate curriculum
may be handily transformed into the following arguments: 1)
coursework from the formal discipline of philosophy is in the
best position to provide students with the skills for Socratic
self-examination 2) courses that fall somewhat outside the
traditional philosophy department or curriculum must at least
maintain close ties with the department and its curricula 3)
other disciplines may fall prey to fashionable excesses that
only philosophy, and Socratic examination in particular, can
overcome. What this leads one to discern is that, for Nussbaum,
philosophy exists as a cohesive discipline, essentially free
from the vagaries of the times and fashions: it is premised on
Socratic self-examination, a rational and unbiased method that
can best be taught under the auspices of philosophers and
philosophy departments.
At first blush, Nussbaum's notion of philosophy is akin to
what customarily passes as Socratic method. Consider the
following passage: "Philosophy supplies something that formerly
was lacking—an active control or grasp of questions, the
ability to make distinctions, a style of interaction that does
not rest on mere assertion and counterassertion..."(pp.17-18).
On further examination, however, her view of philosophy as
Socratic method is untenable. For if philosophy is predicated
upon Socratic method, other disciplines and teachers (e.g.
English, communication studies, and the like) who also utilize the
Socratic method must either be doing philosophy, or are
co-opting Socratic method and rendering the need for philosophers
and philosophy departments moot. Although maintaining that only
philosophy and philosophers are adequately equipped to wield the
sword of Socrates, Nussbaum nevertheless does not supply a
cogent rebuttal to the argument of why exactly it must be
philosophers who create the critical environments for this sort
of self-examination. She does however, provide a problematic
one, which will be taken up later.
Most disturbing is her refusal to grant that philosophic
methods do indeed flourish in many departments—English and
communications studies included. And these methods are of the
Socratic kind, in that what is practiced is precisely informal
reasoning and cogent argumentation. These can both be subsumed
under the heading of rhetoric. Rhetoric is practiced extensively
in many humanities and social sciences as a tool to enhance
critical thinking, writing and oratory. Aristotle, in his
elevation of rhetoric from what was considered mere sophistry to
an art alongside both logic and dialectic, ensured for it a more
respected place among the categories of knowledge. And rhetoric
became a valuable philosophical discipline in its own right,
particularly during the Renaissance, with thinkers such as
Montaigne (Toulmin, 1990, p.30). In this Aristotelian sense,
Socrates himself was practicing rhetoric. "It is, then,
established that rhetoric is not concerned with any single
delimited kind of subject but is like dialectic and that it is a
useful art. It is also clear that its function is not
persuasion. It is rather the detection of the persuasive aspects
of each matter and this is in line with all other skills.
(Lawson-Tancred,Trans. 1991, pp.69-70)." The focused, critical
rhetoric as practiced in American universities of today is not
the sophistry of the streets and markets of ancient Athens. It
has its legacy with Socrates and his followers.
Nussbaum is wrong to castigate the other humanities as
essentially astray, arguing as she does that they alone are prey
to poststructuralist and postmodernist tendencies, and that
these tendencies represent examples of unclear thinking.
"Post-modernists do not justify their more extreme
conclusions with compelling arguments. Nor do they even
grapple with the technical issues about physics and
language that any modern account of these matters needs to
confront. For this reason, their influence has been
relatively slight in philosophy, where far more nuanced
accounts of these matters abound....This is one further
reason why we should insist that philosophy be a large part
of the undergraduate curriculum: because this field gives
insight into debates that go on elsewhere, and unmasks in
truly Socratic fashion the pretenses of fashionable
authorities." (p.41)
Indeed, much of postmodernism and poststructuralism as it
actually exists is indeed practiced in philosophy departments.
(Note 2) Philosophy departments hold no more guarantee of
freedom from the anti-ideological left and the "grip" of the
postmodern than, say, comparative literature or anthropology.
Furthermore, postmodernism and poststructuralism have provided
valuable insights into the historical construction of dominant
world-views, and have allowed freer expression of hitherto
disenfranchised voices, an undertaking consistent with
democratic values.
By making Socratic reasoning exclusive to the discipline of
Philosophy, Nussbaum has placed this reasoning in the role of
being anti-democratic—something Nussbaum characteristically
wishes to avoid. Further, her identification of Socratic
reasoning with philosophy renders her conception of philosophy
equally anti-democratic, or at least potentially so. What
remains is a Socratic reasoning that must betray itself.
Nonetheless, she continues to label her method of reasoning as
Socratic. Precisely what, then, does this reasoning consist of?
Nussbaum is somewhat hesitant to describe it, other than to say
that it leads to a Socratic virtue. And the highest virtue, at
least for the purposes of education and Nussbaum's argument
(p.10), is democratic citizenship. Democracy and the ideal of a
democratic citizenship are made the pinnacle of Nussbaum's
Socratic self-examination. This contrasts with Plato, who was
characteristically antagonistic to democracy.
"The historical Socrates is committed to awakening each and
every person to self-scrutiny. He relies on no sources of
knowledge external to the beliefs of the citizens he
encounters, and he regards democracy as the best of the
available forms of government, though not above criticism.
Plato, by contrast, argues for the restriction of Socratic
questioning to a small, elite group of citizens, who will
eventually gain access to timeless metaphysical sources of
knowledge: these few should rule the many." (Nussbaum, 1997,
p.26) (Notes 3 & 4)
Nussbaum's conception of democracy can only be developed in and
from a discipline that not only professes the kind of Socratic
self-examination that Nussbaum applauds, but that places
democracy as its highest virtue and achievement. This discipline
is argued to be philosophy. Philosophy for Nussbaum, through her
characteristic Socratic self-examination, attains and
establishes the virtue of democracy. Nowhere, however, is an
argument offered why Socratic reasoning might not lead to
this particular virtue, but to some other. One suspects that
proofs for the assumption that democracy requires Socratic self-
examination rest with the fact that democracy, and the method
that gives rise to it, has already been labeled as such. There
is a circularity to this argument. It common to claim that
historically democracy begins with Athens and that Socrates was
Athens' chief philosophical defender. Socrates is thus
identified with democracy by historiographic fiat. But this
identification is open to question.
For it suggests that, ultimately, all discourse of a
Socratic nature must have the effect of supporting democracy.
But why assume that Socratic examination necessarily leads to
democracy? Why fix its conclusions in such a non-Socratic
manner? As Nussbaum herself argues, Socratic reasoning occurs
whenever individuals think for themselves. It does not stand to
any reason of a Socratic kind that these individuals will be
ultimately led to democracy: nor does it follow that classrooms,
if they are to be truly democratic, must be free from engaging
in non-democratic models and methods. Sometimes, perhaps,
ascribing to and subsuming oneself to other forms of authority
might prove to be empancipatory as well. (Note 5) The very
"democracy" of ideas that allows students and teachers to
contemplate in this manner may take them to a wholly
undemocratic place—as the case of Plato demonstrates (Nussbaum,
1997, p.26).
Socratic self-examination is thereby placed in the
predicament of having to prostrate itself before the very
democracy that it purportedly generates. Its forced utility for
democracy places it in a state of subjugation. This state is a
profoundly undemocratic one. In practical terms, teachers
and students can only utilize Socratic self-examination when it
leads to a democratic conclusion—a conclusion that supposes
democracy and the democratic way to be the sole outcome of
Socratic self-examination. (Note 6) Alternatives are not to be
permitted.
In this way, Nussbaum's task ultimately betrays itself as an
antidemocratic one. By constraining Socratic self-examination
to serve only democratic purposes, she removes the possibility
of allowing any conclusions thereby reached from being
undertaken in a truly democratic fashion. The purpose of the
dissemination of this method by philosophers and philosophy
departments now becomes evident. And the "why" of philosophy
thereby becomes clear. It is because for Nussbaum there must
exist an a priori foundation to philosophy—one that can
be located in no other discipline. This allows Nussbaum to
elevate the path by which democracy is intellectualized to the
realm of reification. Democracy becomes, as a result of its
privileged path and position, aristocratic. Nussbaum maintains
that philosophy must play a strong, identifiable role in the
education of undergraduate liberal arts students, ostensibly to
protect them from the vagaries of "fashionable" theory, as well
as conservative rhetoric. Her goal is professedly
anti-ideological, in her quest for the true content of philosophy.
But one suspects that at bottom there is an agenda here, an
ideology all of its own: one that is predicated upon a strict
and inflexible metaphysics, and that seeks to push across its
own cogency against those of other ideologies. With Nussbaum,
the conflict of embracing both democracy and metaphysics reveals
itself as a self-destructive paradox. As one who professes
democracy, she heartily recommends the Socratic variety of
reasoning that implies and leads to democracy. But as a
metaphysician, she must temper this way of reasoning with a
fixity that ultimately serves to undermine the very democracy
she wishes to construct.
Although Nussbaum's presentation of her ideas is effective and
engaging, it is difficult to accept her attempt to deploy
Socrates in a manner that seems to me to be antithetical to the
spirit of the great thinker's views. To this extent, Nussbaum's
book is, ironically, less examined—and hence less Socratic—than
it might have been.
Notes
- The locus of philosophy in the curriculum comes at least in
part from her exegesis and acceptance of the educational
writings of Seneca and Epictetus. Following Seneca, Nussbaum
(1994, p.26) argues "The only study truly worthy of the name
liberalis is philosophy: for that liberates the mind. It is good
to have had the basic education embodied in conventional liberal
studies, but philosophy is the only study whose activity is
itself an exercise of human freedom."
- Here are the course titles of a leading university's
(Pennsylvania State) senior undergraduate curriculum as obtained
from the Penn State web page: 1) Contemporary Feminist Social
and Political Philosophy; 2)Aesthetics; 3)Metaphysics; 4)Medical
Ethics; 5)Plato; 6)Studies in Medieval Philosophy; 7)Nietzsche;
8)Heidegger; 9) Wittgenstein. Of nine course offerings for the
fall semester of 1997, fully three (Contemporary Feminist Social
and Political Philosophy, Nietzsche and Heidegger) deal with
aspects or thinkers that can have been considered "postmodern."
- Consider the following passage from the Republic: "Then is
it not in order that such a one may have a like government with
the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best
man who has within himself the divine governing principle, not
because we suppose...that the slave should be governed for his
own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to
be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably
indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from
without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and
friendly because are governance and guidance are the same."
(Plato, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, trans. p.590.C. Italics
mine.) The argument here is that, if one is not intellectually
capable of an inward transformation towards a divine government,
then one needs to have it placed upon oneself. The assumption
that not all are capable (nor desirable) of taking part in such
a government is in itself inimical to our "contemporary"
conception of democracy. Socratic examination may be all well
and fine for some, but evidently not approachable for others, as
this passage suggests.
- Arguments for a Socrates free from Plato have been advanced
by many scholars eager to demonstrate that Plato projected his
own ambitious philosophy into the "mouth" of his erstwhile
mentor. Chief among these is Nussbaum and Gregory Vlastos. In
this particular passage in the Republic, written during
what has come to be known as Plato's middle period, I grant that
she may be correct. For it seems that passages like this are
inimical to Socrates's avowed championing of democracy. However,
one can push this argument only so far. There are numerous other
examples of a crypto-aristocratic attitude, found even in
Plato's early dialogues. The "Gadfly" episode in the "Apology"
is perhaps the best known. For here Socrates mocks the jury and
citizenry of Athens as he details, quite seriously, his role as
being "specially appointed by God." In short, I don't think we
can completely devolve Socrates from arguments privileging some
"aristocratic" features.
- The idea of the democratic classroom as free from any
authoritarian impulses has its initial deconstruction in Mary
Anne Raywid's response (1996) to Dewey's Democratic classroom.
The argument here is that a democratic classroom cannot be
disengaged from any and all authority, including both teacher
and student-led varieties, for the undertaking of an
authority-free Democracy is both an impossibility and
undesirability. The former because of the manifest
power/knowledge differential between students and teachers, the
latter because the negation of authority fixes the agent of
change in a position whereby no critical engagement of
ideological and practical circumstances can occur. On these
points see also the following:
- Luke, C. (1996). Feminist Pedagogy Theory: Reflections on
Power and Authority. Educational Theory, 46(3), 283-302.
p.297.
-
Worsfold,V. (1997). Teaching Democracy Democratically.
Educational Theory, 47(3), 395-410. p.398.
-
Giroux, H. (1997). Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope: Theory,
Culture, and Schooling. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 103.
- In point of fact, it has been argued that, embedded within
Socrates's dialogue, is a strain of anti-democratic posturing and
Machiavellian secrecy. For example, Benjamin Barber argues "The
origin of this cabalist belief in secrecy and conspiracy can be
traced back to the trial of Socrates, which, if it taught
philosophers anything, taught them the imperative of prudence,
even duplicity, in philosophical argument. Speak to the envious
and impetuous masses in one tongue, and speak to fellow
philosophers and their gifted apprentices in another. To the
first audience, the philosopher must speak in soothing riddles
and noble lies that deceive in order to placate; to the second,
he dares speak the unvarnished truth." (1992, p. 168.) Such
duplicity is arguably a subversion of a free-spirited
democracy—and judging by Nussbaum's pronouncements, not
at all what her
liberal-democratic education purports to provide students.
Ironically, this aspect of Socrates is very much in line with
the view of Alan Bloom, whom Nussbaum castigates. See Nussbaum,
M. (5 November 1987). "Bloom's The Closing of the American
Mind," New York Review of Books.
References
Aristotle. (1991). H. Lawson-Tancred, Trans. The Art of
Rhetoric. London:Penguin Books.
Barber, B. (1992). An Aristocracy of Everyone: The Politics
of Education and the Future of America. New York:
Ballantine Books.
Dewey, J.(1994). Democracy and Education. New York: The
Free Press.
Nussbaum, M. (1994). The Therapy of Desire: Theory and
Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Plato. (1961). "The Republic" in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Eds.
The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Raywid, M.A. (1996). The Democratic Classroom: Mistake or
Misnomer? Theory into Practice, 15(1), 37-46.
Toulmin, S. (1990). Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
About the Reviewer
James Scott Johnston
Email: jsjhnstn@students.uiuc.edu
James Scott Johnston is a doctoral student in philosophy of
education in the Department of Educational Policy Studies at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research
interests include the educational ideas of Nietzsche, Kant and
Dewey.
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